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Abstract. The keyed duplex construction was introduced by Bertoni
et al. (SAC 2011) and recently generalized to full-state absorption byMen-
nink et al. (ASIACRYPT 2015). We present a generalization of the full-
state keyed duplex that natively supports multiple instances by design,
and perform a security analysis that improves over that ofMennink et al. in
terms of a more modular security analysis and a stronger and more adap-
tive security bound. Via the introduction of an additional parameter to
the analysis, our bound demonstrates a significant security improvement
in case of nonce-respecting adversaries. Furthermore, by supporting mul-
tiple instances by design, instead of adapting the security model to it, we
manage to derive a security bound that is largely independent of the num-
ber of instances.
Keywords: Duplex construction · Full-state · Distinguishing bounds ·
Authenticated encryption
1 Introduction
Bertoni et al. [8] introduced the sponge construction as an approach to design
hash functions with variable output length (later called extendable output func-
tions (XOF)). The construction faced rapid traction in light of NIST’s SHA-
3 competition, with multiple candidates inspired by the sponge methodology.
Keccak, the eventual winner of the competition and now standardized as SHA-
3 [27], internally uses the sponge construction. The sponge construction found
quick adoption in the area of lightweight hashing [19,32]. Also beyond the area
of hash functions various applications of the sponge construction appeared such
as keystream generation and MAC computation [12], reseedable pseudorandom
sequence generation [10,30], and authenticated encryption [11,14]. In particular,
the ongoing CAESAR competition for the development of a portfolio of authenti-
cated encryption schemes has received about a dozen sponge-based submissions.
At a high level, the sponge construction operates on a state of b bits. This
is split into an inner part of size c bits and an outer part of size r bits,
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where b = c + r. Data absorption and squeezing is done via the outer part,
r bits at a time, interleaved with evaluations of a b-bit permutation f . Bertoni
et al. [9] proved a bound on the security of the sponge construction in the indif-
ferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [37]. While it was clear from the start
that this birthday-type bound in the capacity is tight for the unkeyed use cases,
i.e., hashing, for the keyed use cases of the sponge it appeared that a higher level
of security could be achieved. This has resulted in an impressive series of papers
on the generic security of keyed versions of the sponge, with bounds improving
and the construction becoming more efficient.
1.1 Keyed Sponge and Keyed Duplex
Keyed Sponge. Bertoni et al.’s original keyed sponge [13] was simply the
sponge with input (K‖M) where K is the key. Chang et al. [21] suggested an
alternative where the initial state of the sponge simply contains the key in its
inner part. Andreeva et al. [2] generalized and improved the analyses of both the
outer- and inner-keyed sponge, and also considered security of these functions
in the multi-target setting. In a recent analysis their bounds were improved by
Naito and Yasuda in [42]. All of these results, however, stayed relatively close
to the (keyless) sponge design that absorbs input in blocks of r bits in the
outer part of the state. It turned out that, thanks to the secrecy of part of the
state after key injection, one can absorb data over the full state, and therewith
achieve maximal compression. Full-state absorbing was first explicitly proposed
in a variant of sponge for computing MACs: donkeySponge [14]. It also found
application in various recent sponge-inspired designs, such as Chaskey [41].
Nearly tight bounds for the full-state absorbing keyed sponge were given by
Gazˇi et al. [29] but their analysis was limited to the case of fixed output length.
Mennink et al. [38] generalized and formalized the idea of the full-state keyed
sponge and presented an improved security bound for the general case where the
output length is variable.
Keyed Duplex. Whereas the keyed sponge serves message authentication and
stream encryption, authenticated encryption is mostly done via the keyed duplex
construction [11]. This is a stateful construction that consists of an initialization
interface and a duplexing interface. Initialization resets the state and a duplexing
call absorbs a data block of at most r − 1 bits, applies the underlying permutation
f and squeezes at most r bits. Bertoni et al. [11] proved that the output of
duplexing calls can be simulated by calls to a sponge, a fortiori making duplex
as strong as sponge.
Mennink et al. [38] introduced the full-state keyed duplex and derived a
security bound on this construction with dominating terms:
μN
2k
+
M2
2c
. (1)
Here M is the data complexity (total number of initialization and duplexing
calls), N the computational complexity (total number of offline calls to f),
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μ ≤ 2M is a term called the “multiplicity,” and k the size of the key. This
security bound was derived by describing the full-state keyed duplex in terms
of the full-state keyed sponge. A naive bounding of μ (to cover the strongest
possible adversary) yields a dominating term of the form 2MN/2k, implying a
security strength erosion of log2 M with respect to exhaustive key search.
The duplex construction finds multiple uses in the CAESAR competition [20]
in the embodiment of the authenticated encryption mode SpongeWrap [11] or
close variants of it. The recent line of research on improving bounds of sponge-
inspired authenticated encryption schemes, set by Jovanovic et al. [35], Sasaki
and Yasuda [46], and Reyhanitabar et al. [44], can be seen as an analysis of a
specific use case of the keyed duplex. The Full-State SpongeWrap [38], an authen-
ticated encryption scheme designed from the full-state keyed duplex, improves
over these results. Particularly, the idea already found application in the Motorist
mode of the CAESAR submission Keyak [16].
Trading Sponge for Duplex. As said, the duplex can be simulated by the
sponge, but not the other way around. This is the case because duplex pads
each input block and cannot simulate sponge inputs with, e.g., long sequences of
zeroes. It is therefore natural that Mennink et al. [38] derived a security bound
on the full-state keyed duplex by viewing it as an extension to the full-state
keyed sponge. However, we observe that the introduction of full-state absorption
changes that situation: the full-state keyed duplex can simulate the full-state
keyed sponge. All keyed usages of the sponge can be described quite naturally as
application of the keyed duplex and it turns out that proving security of keyed
duplex is easier than that of keyed sponge. Therefore, in keyed use cases, the
duplex is preferred as basic building block over the sponge.
1.2 Multi-target Security
The problem of multi-target security of cryptographic designs has been acknowl-
edged and analyzed for years. Biham [17] considered the security of blockciphers
in the multi-target setting and shows that the security strength can erode to
half the key size if data processed by sufficiently many keys is available. Various
extensions have subsequently appeared [7,18,34]. It has been demonstrated (see,
e.g., [5] for public key encryption and [22] for message authentication codes) that
the security of a scheme in the multi-target setting can be reduced to the secu-
rity in the single-target setting, at a security loss proportional to the number of
keys used.
However, in certain cases, a dedicated analysis in the multi-target setting
could render improved bounds. Andreeva et al. [2] considered the security of
the outer- and inner-keyed sponge in the multi-target setting, a proof which
internally featured a security analysis of the Even-Mansour blockcipher in the
multi-target setting. The direction of multi-target security got subsequently
popularized by Mouha and Luykx [40], leading to various multi-target secu-
rity results [4,33] with security bounds (almost) independent of the number of
targets involved.
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1.3 Our Contribution
We present a generalization of the full-state keyed duplex that facilitates multiple
instances by design (Sect. 2.2). This generalization is realized via the formaliza-
tion of a state initialization function that has access to a key array K consisting
of u keys of size k, generated following a certain distribution. Given as input a
key index δ and an initialization vector iv, it initializes the state using iv and
the δth key taken from K. We capture its functional behavior under the name of
an extendable input function (XIF) and explicitly define its idealized instance.
Unlike the approach of Mennink et al. [38], who viewed the full-state keyed
duplex as an extension to the full-state keyed sponge, our analysis is a dedi-
cated analysis of the full-state keyed duplex. To accommodate bounds for dif-
ferent use cases, we have applied a re-phasing to the definition of the keyed
duplex. In former definitions of the (keyed) duplex, a duplexing call consisted
of input injection, applying the permutation f , and then output extraction. In
our new definition, the processing is as follows: first the permutation f , then
output extraction, and finally input injection. This adjustment reflects a prop-
erty present in practically all modes based on the keyed duplex, namely that the
user (or adversary) must provide the input before knowing the previous output.
The re-phasing allows us to prove a bound on keyed duplex that is tight even
for those use cases. The fact that, in previous definitions, an adversary could see
the output before providing the input allowed it to force the outer part of the
state to a value of its choice, and as such gave rise to a term in the bound at
worst MN/2c and at best μN/2c, where μ is a term that reflects a property of
the transcript that needs to be bound by out-of-band reasonings.
Alongside the re-phasing, we have eliminated the term μ and express the
bound purely as a function of the adversary’s capabilities. Next to the total
offline complexity N , i.e., the number queries the adversary can make to f and
the total online complexity M , i.e., the total number of construction queries (to
keyed duplex or ideal XIF), we introduce two metrics: L and Ω, both reflecting
the ability of the adversary to force the outer part of the state to a value of its
choice. The metric L counts the number of construction queries with repeated
path (intuitively, a concatenation of all data blocks up to a certain permutation
call), which may typically occur in MAC functions and authenticated encryption
schemes that do not impose nonce uniqueness. The metric Ω counts the number
of construction queries where the adversary can overwrite the outer part of the
state. Such a possibility may occur in authenticated encryption schemes that
release unverified decrypted ciphertext (cf., [1]). A comparison of the scheme
analyzed in this work with those in earlier works is given in Table 1.
We prove in Sect. 4 a bound on the advantage of distinguishing a full-state
keyed duplex from an ideal XIF in a multi-target setting. We here give the
bound for several settings, all of which having multiple keys sampled uniformly
at random without replacement. For adversaries with the ability to send queries
with repeated paths and queries that overwrite the outer part of the state, the
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Table 1. Comparison of the schemes analyzed in earlier works and this work. By “pure
bound” we mean that the derived security bound is expressed purely as a function of
the adversary’s capabilities. Differences in bounds are not reflected by the table.
Full state absorption Extendable output Multi-target Pure bound
Bertoni et al. [13] —  — 
Bertoni et al. [11] —  — 
Chang et al. [21] —  — 
Andreeva et al. [2] —   —
Gazˇi et al. [29]  — — 
Mennink et al. [38]   — —
Naito and Yasuda [42] —  — 
This work    
dominating terms in our bound are:
qivN
2k
+
(L + Ω)N
2c
. (2)
The metric qiv denotes the maximum number of sessions started with the same
iv but different keys. For adversaries that cannot send queries with repeated
paths or send queries that overwrite the outer part of the state, one of the
dominating terms depends on the occurrence of multicollisions via a coefficient
νMr,c that is fully determined by the data complexity M and parameters r and c
(see Sect. 6.5, and particularly Fig. 4). For wide permutations we can have large
rates (i.e., r > 2 log2(M) + c) and the dominating terms in our bound are:
qivN
2k
+
N
2c−1
. (3)
For relatively small rates the data complexity can be such that M > 2r−1 and for
that range the dominating terms are upper bounded by (assuming ν2Mr,c ≤ bM2r+1 ):
qivN
2k
+
bMN
2b
+
M2
2b
. (4)
For the case in-between where M is in the range 2(r−c)/2 < M ≤ 2r−1, the
bound becomes (assuming ν2Mr,c ≤ min(b/ log 2
r
2M , b/4)):
qivN
2k
+
bN
max(4, r − 1 − log2 M)2c−1
. (5)
This bound is valid for permutation widths of 200 and above. These bounds are
significantly better than that of [38].
Concretely, in implementations of duplex-based authenticated encryption
schemes that respect the nonce requirement and do not release unverified plain-
text, we have L = Ω = 0. Assuming keys are randomly sampled without replace-
ment, the generic security is governed by (3), (4), or (5). Depending on the
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Table 2. Application of our analysis to Ketje, Ascon, NORX, and Keyak. For the
nonce misuse case, we consider L + Ω = M/2. A “Strength” equal to s means that it
requires a computational effort 2s to distinguish. Here, a = log2(Mr).
Scheme Parameters Respecting (Eqs. (3)–(5)) Misuse (Eq. (2))
b c r Strength Equation Strength
Ketje [15] Jr 200 184 16 min{196 − a, 177} (4), (5) 189 − a
Sr 400 368 32 min{396 − a, 360} (4), (5) 374 − a
Ascon [24] 128 320 256 64 min{317 − a, 248} (4), (5) 263 − a
128a 320 192 128 min{318 − a, 184} (4), (5) 200 − a
NORX [3] 32 512 128 384 127 (3) 137 − a
64 1024 256 768 255 (3) 266 − a
Keyak [16] River 800 256 544 255 (3) 266 − a
Lake 1600 256 1344 255 (3) 267 − a
parameters, a scheme is either in case (3), or case (4)–(5), where a transition
happens for M = 2r−1. Table 2 summarizes achievable security strengths for the
duplex-based CAESAR contenders.
Our general security bound, covering among others a broader spectrum of
key sampling distributions, is given in Theorem1. It is noteworthy that, via the
built-in support of multiple targets, we manage to obtain a security bound that
is largely independent of the number of users u: the only appearance is in the
key guessing part, qivN/2k, which shows an expected decrease in the security
strength of exhaustive key search by a term log2 qiv. Note that security erosion
can be avoided altogether by requiring iv to be a global nonce, different for each
initialization call (irrespective of the used key).
Our analysis improves over the one of [38] in multiple aspects. First, our secu-
rity bound shows less security erosion for increasing data complexities. Whereas
in (1) security strength erodes to k − log2 M , in (2) this is c − log2(L+Ω) with
L+Ω < M . By taking c > k + log2 Mmax with Mmax some upper bound on the
amount of data an adversary can get its hands on, one can guarantee that this
term does not allow attacks faster than exhaustive key search.
Second, via the use of parameters L and Ω our bound allows for a more
flexible interpretation and a wide range of use cases. For example, in stream
ciphers, L = Ω = 0 by design. This also holds for most duplex-based authenti-
cated encryption schemes in the case of nonce-respecting adversaries that cannot
obtain unverified decrypted ciphertexts.
Third, even in the general case (with key size taken equal to c bits and no
nonce restriction on iv), our bound still improves over the one of [38] by replacing
the multiplicity metric, that can only be evaluated a posteriori, by the metrics
L and Ω, that reflect what the adversary can do.
Fourth, in our approach we address the multi-key aspect natively. This allows
us to determine the required set of properties on the joint distribution of all
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keys under attack. Theorem1 works for arbitrary key sampling techniques with
individual keys of sufficient min-entropy and the probability that two keys in the
array collide is small enough, and demonstrates that the full-state keyed duplex
remains secure even if the keys are not independently and uniformly randomly
distributed.
Finally, we perform an analysis on the contribution of outer-state multi-
collisions to the bound that is of independent interest. This analysis strongly
contributes to the tightness of our bounds, as we illustrate in the Stairway to
Heaven graph in Fig. 4.
1.4 Notation
For an integer n ∈ N, we denote Zn = {0, . . . , n − 1} and by Zn2 the set of bit
strings of length n. Z∗2 denotes the set of bit strings of arbitrary length. For two
bit strings s, t ∈ Zn2 , their bitwise addition is denoted s + t. The expression s
denotes the bitstring s truncated to its first  bits. A random oracle [6] RO :
Z
∗
2 → Zn2 is a function that maps bit strings of arbitrary length to bit strings of
some length n. In this paper, the value of n is determined by the context. We
denote by (x)(y) the falling factorial power (x)(y) = x(x − 1) · · · (x − y + 1).
Throughout this work, b denotes the width of the permutation f . The para-
meters c and r denote the capacity and rate, where b = c + r. For a state value
s ∈ Zb2, we follow the general convention to define its outer part by s ∈ Zr2 and
its inner part by ŝ ∈ Zc2, in such a way that s = s||ŝ. The key size is convention-
ally denoted by k, and the number of users by u. Throughout, we assume that
u ≤ 2k, and regularly use an encoding function Encode : Zu → Zk2 , mapping
integers from Zu to k-bit strings in some injective way.
2 Constructions
In Sect. 2.1, we will discuss the key sampling technique used in this work. The
keyed duplex construction is introduced in Sect. 2.2, and we present its “ideal
equivalent,” the ideal extendable input function, in Sect. 2.3. To suit the secu-
rity analysis, we will also need an in-between hybrid, the randomized duplex,
discussed in Sect. 2.4.
2.1 Key Sampling
Our keyed duplex construction has built-in multi-user support, and we start
with a formalization of the key sampling that we consider. At a high level, our
formalization is not specific for the keyed duplex, and may be of independent
interest for modeling multi-target attacks.
In our formalization the adversary can invoke a keyed object (block cipher,
stream cipher, PRF, keyed sponge, . . . ) with a key selected from a key array K
containing u keys, each of length k bits:
K = (K[0], . . . ,K[u − 1]) ∈ (Zk2
)u
.
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These keys are sampled from the space of k-bit keys according to some dis-
tribution DK. This distribution can, in theory, be anything. In particular, the
distribution of the key with index δ may depend on the values of the δ keys
sampled before.
Two plausible examples of the key distribution are random sampling with
replacement and random sampling without replacement. In the former case, all
keys are generated uniformly at random and pairwise independent, but it may
cause problems in case of accidental collisions in the key array. The latter distri-
bution resolves this by generating all keys uniformly at random from the space
of values excluding the ones already sampled. A third, more extreme, example
of DK generates K[0] uniformly at random and defines all subsequent keys as
K[δ] = K[0] + Encode(δ).
Different distributions naturally entail different levels of security, and we
define two characteristics of a distribution that are relevant for our analysis. Note
that the characteristics take u as implicit parameter. The first characteristic is
the min-entropy of the individual keys, defined as
Hmin(DK) = − log2 max
δ∈Zu,a∈Zk2
Pr(K[δ] = a), (6)
or in words, minus the binary logarithm of the probability of the key value to
be selected with the highest probability. The three example samplings outlined
above have min-entropy k, regardless of the value u.
The second characteristic is related to the maximum collision probability
between two keys in the array:
Hcoll(DK) = − log2 max
δ,δ′∈Zu
δ =δ′
Pr(K[δ] = K[δ′]). (7)
Uniform sampling with replacement has maximum collision probability equal to
2−k and so Hcoll(DK) = k. Sampling without replacement and our third example
clearly have collision probability zero, giving Hcoll(DK) = ∞.
2.2 Keyed Duplex Construction
The full-state keyed duplex (KD) construction is defined in Algorithm1, and it
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
It calls a b-bit permutation f and is given access to an array K consisting
of u keys of size k bits. A user can make two calls: initialization and duplexing
calls.
In an initialization call it takes as input a key index δ and a string iv ∈ Zb−k2
and initializes the state as f(K[δ]||iv). In the same call, the user receives an r-bit
output string Z and injects a b-bit string σ. A duplexing call just performs the
latter part: it updates the state by applying f to it, returns to the user an r-bit
output string Z and injects a user-provided b-bit string σ.
Both in initialization and duplexing calls, the output string Z is taken from
the state prior to the addition of σ to it, but the user has to provide σ before
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Fig. 1. Full-state keyed duplex construction KDfK. In this figure, the sequence
of calls is Z = KD.Init(δ, iv, σ, false), Z = KD.Duplexing(σ, true), and Z =
KD.Duplexing(σ, false).
receiving Z. This is in fact a re-phasing compared to the original definition of the
duplex [11] or of the full-state keyed duplex [38], and it aims at better reflect-
ing typical use cases. We illustrate this with the SpongeWrap authenticated
encryption scheme [11] and its more recent variants [38]. In this scheme, each
plaintext block is typically encrypted by (i) applying f , (ii) fetching a block of
key stream, (iii) adding the key stream and plaintext blocks to get a ciphertext
block, and (iv) adding the plaintext block to the outer part of the state. By
inspecting Algorithm 3 in [11], there is systematically a delay between the pro-
duction of key stream and its use, requiring to buffer a key stream block between
the (original) duplexing calls. In contrast, our re-phased calls better match the
sequence of operations.
The flag in the initialization and duplexing calls is required to implement
decryption in SpongeWrap and variants. In that case, the sequence of oper-
ations is the same as above, except that step (iii) consists of adding the key
stream and ciphertext blocks to get a plaintext block. However, a user would
need to see the keystream block before being able to add the plaintext block
in step (iv). One can see, however, that step (iv) is equivalent to overwriting
the outer part of the state with the ciphertext block. Switching between adding
the plaintext block (for encryption) and overwriting with the ciphertext block
(for decryption) is the purpose of the flag. The usage of the flag, alongside the
re-phasing is depicted in Fig. 1.
Note that in Algorithm1 in the case that the flag is true, the outer part
of the state is overwritten with σ. For consistency with the algorithms of con-
structions we will introduce shortly, this is formalized as bitwise adding Z to σ
before its addition to the state if flag is true. Alternatively, one could define an
authenticated encryption mode that does not allow overwriting the state with
the ciphertext block C. For example, encryption would be C = P + M × Z,
with P the plaintext block and M a simple invertible matrix. Upon decryption,
the outer part of the state then becomes C + (M + I) × Z. If M is chosen such
that M+ I is invertible, the adversary has no control over the outer part of the
state after the duplexing call. This would require changing “σ ← σ + Z” into
“σ ← σ + M × Z” in Algorithm1.
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Algorithm 1. Full-state keyed duplex construction KDfK
Require: r < b, k ≤ b
Instantiation: KD ← KDfK with K an array of u keys of size k
Key array: KD.K
DK←−− K
Interface: Z = KD.Init(δ, iv, σ, flag) with δ ∈ Zu, iv ∈ Zb−k2 , σ ∈ Zb2, flag ∈
{true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
s ← f(K[δ]||iv)
Z ← sr
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
s ← s + σ
return Z
Interface: Z = KD.Duplexing(σ, flag) with σ ∈ Zb2, flag ∈ {true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
s ← f(s)
Z ← sr
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
s ← s + σ
return Z
2.3 Ideal Extendable Input Function
We define an ideal extendable input function (IXIF) in Algorithm2. It has the
same interface as KD, but instead it uses a random oracle RO : Z∗2 → Zr2 to
generate its responses. In particular, every initialization call initializes a Path
as Encode(δ)||iv. In both initialization and duplexing calls, an r-bit output is
generated by evaluating RO(Path) and the b-bit input string σ is absorbed by
appending it to the Path. Figure 2 has an illustration of IXIF (at the right).
Note that IXIF properly captures the random equivalent of the full-state
keyed duplex: it simply returns random values from Zr2 for every new path, and
repeated paths result in identical responses. IXIF is in fact almost equivalent to
the duplex as presented by Mennink et al. [38]: as a matter of fact, when (i) not
considering multiple keys for our construction and (ii) avoiding overlap of the
iv with the key (as possible in the construction of [38]), the ideal functionalities
are the same. In our analysis, we do not consider overlap of the iv with the key
as (i) it unnecessarily complicates the analysis and (ii) we discourage it as it
may be a security risk if the keys in the key array K are not independently and
uniformly randomly distributed.
2.4 Randomized Duplex Construction
To simplify our security analysis, we introduce a hybrid algorithm lying in-
between KD and IXIF: the full-state randomized duplex (RD) construction. It
is defined in Algorithm3. It again has the same interface as KD, but the calls
to the permutation f and the access to a key array K have been replaced by
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Algorithm 2. Ideal extendable input function IXIFRO
Instantiation: IXIF ← IXIFRO
Path: IXIF.Path ← empty string
Interface: Z = IXIF.Init(δ, iv, σ, flag) with δ ∈ Zu, iv ∈ Zb−k2 , σ ∈ Zb2, flag ∈
{true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
Path ← Encode(δ)||iv
Z ← RO(Path)
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
Path ← Path||σ
return Z
Interface: Z = IXIF.Duplexing(σ, flag) with σ ∈ Zb2 flag ∈ {true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
Z ← RO(Path)
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
Path ← Path||σ
return Z
two primitives: a uniformly random injective mapping φ : Zu × Zb−k2 → Zb2, and
a uniformly random b-bit permutation π. The injective mapping φ replaces the
keyed state initialization by directly mapping an input (δ, iv) to a b-bit state
value. The permutation π replaces the evaluations of f in the duplexing calls.
In our use of RD, φ and π will be secret primitives. Figure 2 has an illustration
of RD (at the left).
3 Security Setup
The security analysis in this work is performed in the distinguishability frame-
work where one bounds the advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing a real
system from an ideal system.
Definition 1. Let O,P be two collections of oracles with the same interface.
The advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing O from P is defined as
ΔA(O ; P) =
∣
∣Pr
(AO → 1) − Pr (AP → 1)∣∣ .
Our proofs in part use the H-coefficient technique from Patarin [43]. We will
follow the adaptation of Chen and Steinberger [23]. Consider any information-
theoretic deterministic adversary A whose goal is to distinguish O from P, with
its advantage denoted
ΔA(O ; P) .
The interaction of A with its oracle, either O or P, will be stored in a transcript
τ . Denote by DO (resp. DP) the probability distribution of transcripts that can
be obtained from interaction with O (resp. P). Call a transcript τ attainable if
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Algorithm 3. Full-state randomized duplex construction RDφ,π
Require: r < b
Instantiation: RD ← RDφ,π
State: RD.s ← 0b
Interface: Z = RD.Init(δ, iv, σ, flag) with δ ∈ Zu, iv ∈ Zb−k2 , σ ∈ Zb2, flag ∈
{true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
s ← φ(δ, iv)
Z ← sr
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
s ← s + σ
return Z
Interface: Z = RD.Duplexing(σ, flag) with σ ∈ Zb2 flag ∈ {true, false}, and Z ∈ Zr2
s ← π(s)
Z ← sr
if flag = true then σ ← σ + Z
s ← s + σ
return Z
it can be obtained from interacting with P, hence if Pr (DP = τ) > 0. Denote
by T the set of attainable transcripts, and consider any partition T = Tgood ∪
Tbad of the set of attainable transcripts into “good” and “bad” transcripts. The
H-coefficient technique states the following [23].
Lemma 1 (H-coefficient Technique). Consider a fixed information-theoretic
deterministic adversary A whose goal is to distinguish O from P. Let ε be such
that for all τ ∈ Tgood:
Pr (DO = τ)
Pr (DP = τ)
≥ 1 − ε. (8)
Then, ΔA(O ; P) ≤ ε + Pr (DP ∈ Tbad).
The H-coefficient technique can thus be used to neatly bound a distinguishing
advantage in the terminology of Definition 1, and a proof typically goes in four
steps: (i) investigate what transcripts look like, which gives a definition for T ,
(ii) define the partition of T into Tgood and Tbad, (iii) investigate the fraction
of (8) for good transcripts and (iv) analyze the probability that DP generates a
bad transcript.
4 Security of Keyed Duplex Construction
We prove that the full-state keyed duplex construction (KD) is sound. We do so
by proving an upper bound for the advantage of distinguishing the KD calling
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a random permutation f from an ideal extendable input function (IXIF). Both
in the real and ideal world the adversary gets additional query access to f and
f−1, simply denoted as f .
The main result is stated in Sect. 4.2, but before doing so, we specify the
resources of the adversary in Sect. 4.1.
4.1 Quantification of Adversarial Resources
We will consider information-theoretic adversaries that have two oracle inter-
faces: a construction oracle, KDfK or IXIF
RO, and a primitive oracle f . For
the construction queries, it can make initialization queries or duplexing queries.
Note that, when querying IXIFRO, every query has a path Path associated to
it. To unify notation, we also associate a Path to each query (initialization or
duplexing) to KDfK. This Path is defined the straightforward way: it simply con-
sists of the concatenation of Encode(δ), iv of the most recent initialization call
and all σ-values that have been queried after the last initialization but before
the current query. Using this formalization, every initialization or duplexing call
that the adversary makes to KDfK or IXIF
RO can be properly captured by a
tuple
(Path, Z, σ),
where, intuitively, Path is all data that is used to generate response Z ∈ Zr2, and
σ ∈ Zb2 is the input string (slightly abusing notation; σ = σ if flag = false and
σ = σ + (Z||0c) if flag = true).
Following Andreeva et al. [2], we specify adversarial resources that impose
limits on the transcripts that any adversary can obtain. The basic resource met-
rics are quantitative: they specify the number of queries an adversary is allowed
to make for each type.
– N : the number of primitive queries. It corresponds to computations requiring
no access to the (keyed) construction. It is usually called the time or offline
complexity. In practical use cases, N is only limited by the computing power
and time available to the adversary.
– M : the number of construction queries. It corresponds to the amount of data
processed by the (keyed) construction. It is usually called the data or online
complexity. In many practical use cases, M is limited.
We remark that identical calls are counted only once. In other words, N only
counts the number of primitive queries, and M only counts the number of unique
tuples (Path, σ).
It is possible to perform an analysis solely based on these metrics, but in
order to more accurately cover practical settings that were not covered before
(such as the multi-key setting or the nonce-respecting setting), and to eliminate
the multiplicity (a metric used in all earlier results in this direction), we define
a number of additional metrics.
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– q: the total number of different initialization tuples (Encode(δ), iv). Para-
meter q corresponds to the number of times an adversary can start a fresh
initialization of KD or IXIF.
– qiv: iv multiplicity, the maximum number of different initialization tuples
(Encode(δ), iv) with same iv, maximized over all iv values.
– Ω: the number of queries with flag = true.
– L: equals the number of queries M minus the number of distinct paths. It
corresponds to the number of construction queries that have the same Path
as some prior query.
In many practical use cases, q is limited, but as it turns out re-initialization
queries give the adversary more power. The metric qiv is relevant in multi-target
attacks, where clearly qiv ≤ u. The relevance of Ω and L is the following. In
every query with flag equal to true, the adversary can force the outer part of
the input to f in a later query to a chosen value α by taking σ = α. Note that,
as discussed in Sect. 2.2, by adopting authenticated encryption schemes with a
slightly non-conventional encryption method, Ω can be forced to zero. Similarly,
construction queries with the same path return the same value Z, and hence
allow an adversary to force the outer part of the input to f in a later query
to a chosen value α by taking σ such that σ = Z + α. An adversary can use
this technique to increase the probability of collisions in f(s) + σ and to speed
up inner state recovery. By definition, L ≤ M − 1 but in many cases L is much
smaller. In particular, if one considers KD in the nonce-respecting setting, where
no (Encode(δ), iv) occurs twice, the adversary never generates a repeating path,
and L = 0.
4.2 Main Result
Our bound uses a function that is defined in terms of a simple balls-into-bins
problem.
Definition 2. The multicollision limit function νMr,c, with M a natural number,
returns a natural number and is defined as follows. Assume we uniformly ran-
domly distribute M balls in 2r bins. If we call the number of balls in the bin with
the highest number of balls μ, then νMr,c is defined as the smallest natural number
x that satisfies:
Pr (μ > x) ≤ x
2c
.
In words, when uniformly randomly sampling M elements from a set of 2r ele-
ments, the probability that there is an element that is sampled more than x
times is smaller than x2−c.
Theorem 1. Let f be a random permutation and RO be a random oracle. Let
K be a key array generated using a distribution DK. Let KDfK be the construc-
tion of Algorithm1 and IXIFRO be the construction of Algorithm2 and let νMr,c
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be defined according to Definition 2. For any adversary A with resources as dis-
cussed in Sect. 4.1, and with N + M ≤ 0.1 · 2c,
ΔA(KD
f
K, f ; IXIF
RO, f) ≤ (L + Ω)N
2c
+
2ν2(M−L)r,c (N + 1)
2c
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
+
(M − q − L)q
2b − q +
M(M − L − 1)
2b
+
(M − q − L)q
2Hmin(DK)+min{c,b−k}
+
qivN
2Hmin(DK)
+
(
u
2
)
2Hcoll(DK)
.
The proof is given in Sect. 4.3.
For the case where k + c ≤ b − 1, and where DK corresponds to uniform
sampling without replacement, the bound simplifies to
ΔA(KD
f
K, f ; IXIF
RO, f) ≤ (L + Ω)N
2c
+
2ν2(M−L)r,c (N + 1)
2c
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
+
qivN
2k
+
(M − q − L)q
2k+c−1
+
M(M − L − 1)
2b
.
The behavior of the function νMr,c is discussed in Sect. 6.5 and illustrated in
the Fig. 4, which we refer to as the Stairway to Heaven graph.
4.3 Proof of Theorem1
Let A be any information-theoretic adversary that has access to either, in the
real world (KDfK, f), or in the ideal world (IXIF
RO, f). Note that, as A is
information-theoretic, we can without loss of generality assume that it is deter-
ministic, and we can apply the technique of Sect. 3. By the triangle inequality,
ΔA(KD
f
K, f ; IXIF
RO, f)
≤ΔB(KDfK, f ; RDφ,π, f) + ΔC(RDφ,π, f ; IXIFRO, f), (9)
where RDφ,π for random injection function φ and random permutation π is
the construction of Algorithm3, and where B and C have the same resources
(N,M, q, qiv, L,Ω) as A.
In the last term of (9), RD calls an ideal injective function φ and a random
permutation π, both independent of f , and IXIF calls a random oracle RO, also
independent of f . The oracle access to f therefore does not “help” the adversary
in distinguishing the two, or more formally,
ΔC(RDφ,π, f ; IXIFRO, f) ≤ ΔD(RDφ,π ; IXIFRO). (10)
where D is an adversary with the same construction query parameters as A, but
with no access to f .
The two remaining distances, i.e., the first term of (9) and the term of (10),
will be analyzed in the next lemmas. The proof of Theorem1 directly follows.
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Lemma 2. For any adversary D with resources as discussed in Sect. 4.1 but
with no access to f ,
ΔD(RDφ,π ; IXIFRO) ≤
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
+
M(M − L − 1)
2b
. (11)
Lemma 3. For any adversary B with resources as discussed in Sect. 4.1,
ΔB(KD
f
K, f ; RD
φ,π, f) ≤ (L + Ω)N
2c
+
2ν2(M−L)r,c (N + 1)
2c
+
(M − q − L)q
2b − q
+
(M − q − L)q
2Hmin(DK)+min{c,b−k}
+
qivN
2Hmin(DK)
+
(
u
2
)
2Hcoll(DK)
.
(12)
The proof of Lemma2 is given in Sect. 5, and the proof of Lemma3 is given
in Sect. 6.
5 Distance Between RD and IXIF
In this section we bound the advantage of distinguishing the randomized duplex
from an ideal extendable input function, (11) of Lemma 2. The distinguishing
setup is illustrated in Fig. 2. The derivation is performed using the H-coefficient
technique.
Fig. 2. Distinguishing experiment of RD and IXIF.
Description of Transcripts. The adversary has only a single interface, RDφ,π
or IXIFRO, but can make both initialization and duplexing queries. Following
the discussion of Sect. 4.1, we can unify the two different types of queries, and
summarize the conversation of D with its oracle in a transcript of the form
τC = {(Pathj , Zj , σj)}Mj=1.
The values Zj correspond to the outer part of the state just before σj gets
injected. To make the analysis easier, we give at the end of the experiment for
each query the inner value of the state at the moment Zj is extracted (in the real
world). We denote this as tj = tj ||̂tj with tj = Zj . In the IXIF, ̂tj is a value that
is randomly generated for each path Path and can be expressed as RO′(Path)
for some random oracle RO′ with c-bit output. We integrate those values in the
transcript, yielding:
τ = {(Pathj , tj , σj)}Mj=1.
622 J. Daemen et al.
Definition of Good and Bad Transcripts. We define a transcript τ as bad if
it contains a t-collision or an s-collision, where s = t+ σ. A t-collision is defined
as equal t values despite different Path values:
∃(Path, t, σ), (Path′, t′, σ′) ∈ τ with (Path = Path′) AND (t = t′). (13)
An s-collision is defined as equal s values despite different (Path, σ′) values:
∃(Path, t, σ), (Path′, t′, σ′) ∈ τ with
(
(Path, σ) = (Path′, σ′)) AND (t + σ = t′ + σ′). (14)
In case the oracle is RDφ,π, a t-collision is equivalent to two different inputs to
π with identical outputs; an s-collision corresponds to the case of two identical
inputs to f where the outputs are expected to be distinct. By considering these
transcripts as bad, all queries properly define input-output tuples for φ and π.
Bounding the H-coefficient Ratio for Good Transcripts. Denote O =
RDφ,π and P = IXIFRO for brevity. Consider a good transcript τ ∈ Tgood. For
the real world O, the transcript defines exactly q input-output pairs for φ and
exactly M − q − L input-output pairs for π. It follows that Pr (DO = τ) =
1/((2b)(q)(2b)(M−q−L)). For the ideal world P, every different Path defines
exactly one evaluation of RO(Path)||RO′(Path), so Pr (DP = τ) = 2−(M−L)b.
We consequently obtain that
Pr (DO = τ)
Pr (DP = τ)
≥ 1.
Bounding the Probability of Bad Transcripts in the Ideal World. In
the ideal world, every t is generated as RO(Path)||RO′(Path). As the number
of distinct Path’s in τ is M − L, there are (M − L2
)
possibilities for a t-collision,
each occurring with probability 2−b. The probability of such a collision is hence
(M − L2 )
2b
.
There are
(
M
2
)
occasions for an s-collision. Denote by S the size of the subset
of these occasions for which the adversary can (in the worst case) force the outer
part of s = t + σ to be a value of its choice. Note that S ≤ (L+Ω +12
)
. In the
worst case, in these S occasions the outer part of s always has the same value
and s-collision probability is 2−c. For the
(
M
2
)−S other occasions the s-collision
probability is 2−b. Thus, the probability of an s-collision is upper bound by
(using our bound on S):
(
M
2
) − S
2b
+
S
2c
≤
(
M
2
) − (L+Ω +12
)
2b
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
≤
(
M
2
) − (L+12
)
2b
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
.
The total probability of having a bad transcript is hence upper bound by:
(
M − L
2
)
2b
+
(
M
2
) − (L+12
)
2b
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
=
M(M − L − 1)
2b
+
(
L+Ω +1
2
)
2c
.
As the H-coefficient ratio is larger than 1, this is the bound on the distinguishing
advantage and we have proven Lemma2.
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6 Distance Between KD and RD
In this section we bound the advantage of distinguishing the keyed duplex from
a randomized duplex, (12) of Lemma 3. The analysis consists of four steps. In
Sect. 6.1, we revisit the KD-vs-RD setup, and exclude the case where the queries
made by the adversary result in a forward multiplicity that exceeds a certain
threshold Tfw. Next, in Sect. 6.2 we convert our distinguishing setup to a simpler
one, called the permutation setup and illustrated in Fig. 3. In this setup, the
adversary has direct query access to the primitives φ and π of the randomized
duplex, and at the keyed duplex side, we define two constructions on top of f
that turn out to be hard to distinguish from φ and π. We carefully translate the
resources of the adversary B in the KD-vs-RD setup to those of the adversary
C in the permutation setup. In Sect. 6.3 we subsequently prove a bound in this
setup. This analysis in part depends on a threshold on backward multiplicities
Tbw. In Sect. 6.4 where we return to the KD-vs-RD setup and blend all results.
Finally, in Sects. 6.5 and 6.6 we analyze the function νMr,c that plays an important
role in our analysis.
We remark that forward and backward multiplicity appeared before in
Bertoni et al. [10] and Andreeva et al. [2], but we resolve them internally in
the proof. There is a specific reason for resolving forward multiplicity before the
conversion to the permutation setup and backward multiplicity after this con-
version. Namely, in the permutation setup, an adversary could form its queries so
that the forward multiplicity equals M − q, leading to a non-competitive bound,
while the backward multiplicity cannot be controlled by the adversary as it can-
not make inverse queries to the constructions. It turns out that, as discussed in
Sect. 6.4, we can bound the thresholds as functions of M , L, and Ω.
6.1 The KD-vs-RD Setup
As in Sect. 4.1, we express the conversation that B has with KDfK or RDφ,π in
a transcript of the form:
τC = {(Pathj , Zj , σj)}Mj=1.
We denote by μfw the maximum number of occurrences in this transcript of a
value Zj + σj over all possible values:
μfw = max
α
#{(Pathj , Zj , σj) ∈ τC | Zj + σj = α}. (15)
We now distinguish between two cases: μfw above some threshold Tfw and below
it. Denoting O = (KDfK, f) and P = (RDφ,π, f), we find using a hybrid argu-
ment,
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ΔB(O ; P) =
∣
∣Pr
(BO → 1) − Pr (BP → 1)∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr (BO → 1 ∧ μfw ≤ Tfw
) − Pr (BP → 1 ∧ μfw ≤ Tfw
)∣
∣
+
∣
∣Pr
(BO → 1 ∧ μfw > Tfw
) − Pr (BP → 1 ∧ μfw > Tfw
)∣
∣
≤ ∣∣Pr (BO → 1 ∧ μfw ≤ Tfw
) − Pr (BP → 1 ∧ μfw ≤ Tfw
)∣
∣
+ max
{
Pr (μfw > Tfw for O) ,Pr (μfw > Tfw for P)
}
. (16)
As we will find out (and explicitly mention) in Sect. 6.4, the bound we will derive
on Pr (μfw > Tfw) in fact applies to both O and P, and for brevity denote the
maximum of the two probabilities by PrO,P (μfw > Tfw).
6.2 Entering the Permutation Setup
To come to our simplified setup we define two constructions: the Even-
Mansour construction and a “state initialization construction.” The original
Even-Mansour construction builds a b-bit block cipher from a b-bit permutation
f and takes two b-bit keys K1 and K2 [25,26], and is defined as f(x+K1)+K2.
We consider a variant, where K1 = K2 = 0r||κ with κ a c-bit key, and define
Efκ(x) = f(x + (0
r||κ)) + (0r||κ). (17)
The state initialization construction is a dedicated construction of an injective
function that maps an iv and a key selected from a key array K to a b-bit state
and that takes a c-bit key κ.
Ifκ,K(δ, iv) = f(K[δ]||iv) + (0r||κ). (18)
Now, let κ $←− Zc2 be any c-bit key. We call κ the inner masking key. Using the idea
of bitwise adding the inner masking key twice in-between every two primitive
evaluations [2,21,38], we obtain that: KDfK = RD
Ifκ,K,E
f
κ . We thus obtain for
(16), leaving the condition μfw ≤ Tfw implicit:
ΔB(KD
f
K, f ; RD
φ,π, f) = ΔB(RDI
f
κ,K,E
f
κ , f ; RDφ,π, f)
≤ ΔC(Ifκ,K, Efκ , f ; φ, π, f). (19)
Clearly an adversary B can be simulated by an adversary C as any construction
query can be simulated by queries to the initialization function Oi (Ifκ,K in the
real world and φ in the ideal world) and the duplexing function Od (Efκ in the
real world and π in the ideal world). Hence, we can quantify the resources of
adversary C in terms of the resources of adversary B, making use of the threshold
Tfw on the multiplicity (cf., (16)). This conversion will be formally performed in
Sect. 6.4.
6.3 Distinguishing Bound for the Permutation Setup
We now bound ΔC(I
f
κ,K, E
f
κ , f ; φ, π, f). The permutation setup is illustrated in
Fig. 3. The derivation is performed using the H-coefficient technique.
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Fig. 3. Permutation setup.
Description of Transcripts. The adversary has access to either (Ifκ,K, E
f
κ , f)
or (φ, π, f). The queries of the adversary and their responses are assembled in
three transcripts τf , τd, and τi.
τf = {(xj , yj)}Nj=1 The queries to f and f−1. The transcript does not code
whether the query was y = f(x) or x = f−1(y).
τi = {(δi, ivi, ti)}q
′
i=1 The queries to the initialization function Oi, Ifκ,K in the
real world and φ in the ideal world.
τd = {(si, ti)}M ′i=1 The queries to the duplexing function Od, Efκ in the real
world and π in the ideal world.
The resources of C are defined by the number of queries in each transcript:
N , M ′, and q′, as well as qiv = maxα #{(δ, iv, t) ∈ τi | iv = α}. In addition,
the resources of C are limited on τd, for which the forward multiplicity must be
below the threshold Tfw:
max
α
#{(si, ti) ∈ τd | s¯i = α} ≤ Tfw.
To ease the analysis, we will disclose the full key array K and the inner
masking key κ at the end of the experiment (in the ideal world, κ and the
elements of K will simply be dummy keys). The transcripts are thus of the form
τ = (K, κ, τf , τi, τd). Note that it is fair to assume that none of the transcripts
contains duplicate elements (i.e., the adversary never queries f twice on the same
value). Additionally, as we consider attainable transcripts only and φ, π, f are
injective mappings, τ does not contain collisions.
We define the backward multiplicity as characteristic of the transcript τ :
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Definition 3. In the permutation setup, the backward multiplicity μbw is defined
as:
μbw = max
α
(
#{(si, ti) ∈ τd | t¯i = α} + #{(δ, iv, ti) ∈ τi | t¯i = α}
)
.
Definition of Good and Bad Transcripts. In the real world, every tuple in
(τf , τi, τd) defines exactly one evaluation of f . We define a transcript τ as bad if
it contains an input or output collision of f or if the backward multiplicity is
above some limit Tbw. In other words, τ is bad if one of the following conditions
is satisfied. Input collisions between:
τf and τi : ∃(x, y) ∈ τf , (δ, iv, t) ∈ τi with
(
x = K[δ]||iv); (20)
τf and τd : ∃(x, y) ∈ τf , (s, t) ∈ τd with
(
x = s + 0r||κ); (21)
τi and τd : ∃(δ, iv, t) ∈ τi, (s′, t′) ∈ τd with
(
K[δ]||iv = s′ + 0r||κ); (22)
within τi : ∃(δ, iv, t), (δ′, iv′, t′) ∈ τi with
(
δ = δ′) AND (K[δ]||iv = K[δ′]||iv′).
(23)
Output collisions between:
τf and τi : ∃(x, y) ∈ τf , (δ, iv, t) ∈ τi with
(
y = t + 0r||κ); (24)
τf and τd : ∃(x, y) ∈ τf , (s, t) ∈ τd with
(
y = t + 0r||κ); (25)
τi and τd : ∃(δ, iv, t) ∈ τi, (s′, t′) ∈ τd with
(
t + 0r||κ = t′ + 0r||κ). (26)
Finally, τ is bad if the backward multiplicity μbw is above the threshold Tbw:
μbw > Tbw. (27)
Note that output collisions within τi are excluded by attainability of transcripts.
Similarly, collisions (input or output) within τf as well as collisions within τd are
excluded by attainability of transcripts.
Bounding the H-coefficient Ratio for Good Transcripts. Denote O =
(Ifκ,DK , E
f
κ , f) and P = (φ, π, f) for brevity. Consider a good transcript τ ∈ Tgood.
In the real world O, the transcript defines exactly q′ +M ′ +N input-output
pairs of f , so Pr (DO = τ) = 1/(2b)(q′+M ′+N). In the ideal world P, every tuple
in τf defines exactly N input-output pairs for f , every tuple in τi defines exactly
q′ input-output pairs for φ, and every tuple in τd defines exactly M ′ input-
output pairs for π. It follows that Pr (DP = τ) = 1/((2b)(N)(2b)(q′)(2b)(M ′)). We
consequently obtain that
Pr (DO = τ)
Pr (DP = τ)
≥ 1.
Bounding the Probability of Bad Transcripts in the Ideal World. In the
ideal world, κ is generated uniformly at random. The key array K is generated
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according to distribution DK, cf., Sect. 2.1. We will use the min-entropy and
maximum collision probability definitions of (6) and (7).
For (20), fix any (x, y) ∈ τf . There are at most qiv tuples in τi with iv equal
to the last b − k bits of x. For any of those tuples, the probability that the
first k bits of x are equal to K[δ] is at most 2−Hmin(DK), cf., (6). The collision
probability is hence at most qivN/2Hmin(DK).
For (21), fix any (x, y) ∈ τf . There are at most Tfw tuples in τd with x = s.
For any of those tuples, the probability that x̂ = ŝ + κ is 2−c. The collision
probability is hence at most TfwN/2c.
For (24) or (25), we will assume ¬(27). Fix any (x, y) ∈ τf . There are at most
Tbw tuples in τi ∪ τd with y = t. For any of those tuples, the probability that
ŷ = ̂t + κ is 2−c. The collision probability is hence at most TbwN/2c.
For (22), fix any (δ, iv, t) ∈ τi and any (s′, t′) ∈ τd. Any such combination
sets (22) if 0k||iv + s′ = K[δ]||0b−k + 0r||κ. Note that the randomness of K[δ]
may overlap the one of κ. If k+ c ≤ b, the two queries satisfy the condition with
probability at most 2−(Hmin(DK)+c), cf., (6). On the other hand, if k > b− c, the
first b− c bits of K[δ] has a min-entropy of at least Hmin(DK)− (k − (b− c)). In
this case, the two queries satisfy the condition with probability at most
2−(Hmin(DK)−(k−(b−c))+c) = 2−(Hmin(DK)+b−k).
The collision probability is hence at most M
′q′
2Hmin(DK)+min{c,b−k} , using that τi con-
tains q′ elements and τd contains M ′ elements.
For (26), fix any (δ, iv, t) ∈ τi and any (s′, t′) ∈ τd. As φ and π are only
evaluated in forward direction, and φ is queried at most q′ times, the probability
that t = t′ for these two tuples is at most 1/(2b − q′). The collision probability
is hence at most M ′q′/(2b − q′).
For (23), a collision of this form implies the existence of two distinct δ, δ′
such that K[δ] = K[δ′]. This happens with probability at most
(
u
2
)
/2Hcoll(DK),
cf., (7).
The total probability of having a bad transcript is at most:
(Tfw + Tbw)N
2c
+ PrP (μbw > Tbw) +
M ′q′
2b − q′
+
M ′q′
2Hmin(DK)+min{c,b−k}
+
qivN
2Hmin(DK)
+
(
u
2
)
2Hcoll(DK)
.
(28)
As the H-coefficient ratio is larger than 1, Eq. (28) is the bound on the distin-
guishing advantage.
6.4 Returning to the KD-vs-RD Setup
The resources of C can be computed from those of B (see Sect. 4.1) in the fol-
lowing way:
– q′ ≤ q: for every query to Oi there must be at least one initialization query.
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– M ′ ≤ M − q − L: The minus L is there because queries with repeated paths
just give duplicate queries to Oi and the q initialization queries do not give
queries to Od.
The remaining resources have the same meaning for B and C. Filling in these
values in Eq. (28) and combining with Eq. (16) yields:
ΔB(O ; P) ≤
(
TfwN
2c
+ PrO,P (μfw > Tfw)
)
(29a)
+
(
TbwN
2c
+ PrP (μbw > Tbw)
)
(29b)
+
(M − q − L)q
2b − q +
(M − q − L)q
2Hmin(DK)+min{c,b−k}
(29c)
+
qivN
2Hmin(DK)
+
(
u
2
)
2Hcoll(DK)
. (29d)
Clearly μfw ≤ M − q − L and μbw ≤ M − L. So by taking Tfw = Tbw = M − L,
lines (29a)–(29b) reduce to 2(M − L)N/2c. However, much better bounds can
be obtained by carefully tuning Tfw and Tbw.
Although the probabilities on the μfw and μbw are defined differently (the
former in the KD-vs-RD setup, the latter in the permutation setup), in essence
they are highly related and we can rely on multicollision limit function of
Definition 2 for their analysis. There is one caveat. Definition 2 considers balls
thrown uniformly at random into the 2r bins, hence a bin is hit with probabil-
ity 1/2r. In Lemma6 in upcoming Sect. 6.6, we will prove that for non-uniform
bin allocation where the probability that a ball hits any particular bin is upper
bounded by y2−r, the multicollision limit function is at most νyMr,c . In our case
the states are generated from a set of size at least 2b − M − N (for both O
and P) and thus its outer part is thrown in a bin with probability at most
2c/(2b − M − N), where we use that M + N ≤ 2b−1. Using the fact that νMr,c is
a monotonic function in M and that 2b/(2b − M − N) < 2 for any reasonable
value of M + N , we upper bound the multicollision limit function by ν2(M−L)r,c
We first look at (29b) and treat μbw. As it is a metric of the responses of
queries to π and φ, it is a stochastic variable. It corresponds to the multicollision
limit function of Definition 2, where M − L balls are distributed over 2r bins,
and each bin is hit with probability at most 2/2r. Using above observation, we
take Tbw = ν
2(M−L)
r,c , and (29b) becomes
ν
2(M−L)
r,c N
2c
+
ν
2(M−L)
r,c
2c
=
ν
2(M−L)
r,c (N + 1)
2c
.
The case of μfw in (29c) is slightly more complex. As discussed in Sect. 4.1,
the adversary can enforce the outer part Zj + σj to match a value α in case
Pathj is a repeating path. Moreover, for queries with flag = true, it can also
enforce the outer part to any chosen value. These total to L + Ω queries. For
the remaining queries, for simplicity upper bound by M −L here, the adversary
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Fig. 4. Stairway to Heaven graph: νMr,c computed with (33) for r+ c = 256, with upper
bounds and asymptote for M → ∞.
has no control over the outer part. Therefore, if take Tfw = L+Ω+ν
2(M−L)
r,c , we
have Pr (μfw > Tfw) =
ν2(M−L)r,c
2c . Namely, this is the probability that in the (at
most) M −L queries where the adversary has no control over the outer part, the
multiplicity is above ν2(M−L)r,c assuming that the L+Ω queries are manipulated
to hit the same outer value as those ν2(M−L)r,c queries. Eq. (29a) now becomes:
(L + Ω + ν2(M−L)r,c )N
2c
+
ν
2(M−L)
r,c
2c
=
(L + Ω)N
2c
+
2ν2(M−L)r,c (N + 1)
2c
.
Plugging these two bounds into (29a)–(29b) yields the bound of Lemma3.
6.5 Bounds on νMr,c
We will upper bound νMr,c by approximating the term Pr(μ > x) in Definition 2
by simpler expressions that are strictly larger.
In Definition 2, μ is the maximum of the number of balls over all 2r bins.
If we model the number of balls in a particular bin as a stochastic variable Xi
with some distribution function Di(x) = Pr(Xi ≤ x), clearly, the distribution
function of the maximum over all bins is the product of the distribution functions:
Dmax(x) =
∏
i Di(x). Assuming all variables have the same distribution and that
they are independent, we hence obtain:
Pr(μ > x) = 1 − Pr(μ ≤ x) = 1 − (Pr(X ≤ x))2r . (30)
The distributions that are of interest here are the number of balls in a bin,
and they are not independent as they must sum to M . This means that if we
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know one distribution is high, the others are somewhat lower than if they would
be independent. This makes that the value obtained by taking the product of
factors Pr(X ≤ x) slightly underestimates the probability Pr(μ ≤ x). Using the
inequality (1 − )y ≥ 1 − y, we obtain
(Pr(X ≤ x))2r = (1 − Pr(X > x))2r ≥ 1 − 2r Pr(X > x),
and we obtain for (30):
Pr(μ > x) < 2r Pr(X > x) . (31)
We will now upper bound Pr(X > x). The number of balls x in any particular
bin has a binomial distribution. If the number of bins 2r and the total number
of balls M are large enough, for x > λ this is (tightly) upper bounded by a
Poisson distribution with λ = M2−r. The probability that a Poisson-distributed
variable X is larger than x is given by:
Pr(X > x) =
∑
i≥x
e−λλi
i!
=
e−λλx
x!
∑
i≥0
λi
(i + x)(i)
<
e−λλx
x!
∑
i≥0
λi
xi
=
xe−λλx
(x − λ)x! .
This yields for (31):
Pr(μ > x) < 2r
xe−λλx
(x − λ)x! .
From Definition 2, we obtain that νMr,c is upper bounded by the smallest value x
that satisfies
2be−λλx
(x − λ)x! ≤ 1, (32)
with λ = M2−r. Remarkably, the dependence of νMr,c on r, c and M is only via b =
r+ c and λ = M2−r. Hence, it is a function in two variables b and λ rather than
three. Taking the logarithm of (32), applying Stirling’s approximation (ln(x!) ≥
1
2 ln(2πx) + x(ln(x) − 1)) and rearranging the terms gives:
x (ln(x) − ln(λ) − 1) + ln(x − λ) + 1
2
ln(2πx) + λ ≥ ln(2)b. (33)
We will now derive expressions from (32) and (33) that give insight in the
behavior of this function for the full range of λ.
Case λ < 1. If we consider Eq. (33) with value of x given and we look for the
maximum value of x such that it holds. This gives the value of λ where νMr,c
transitions from x − 1 to x. We can now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The value of λ where νMr,c transitions from x − 1 to x is lower
bounded by 2−b/x.
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Proof. We need to prove that for λ = 2−b/x, inequality (33) holds:
x(ln(x) − 1) + ln(x − 2−b/x) + 1
2
ln(2πx) + 2−b/x ≥ 0.
For x > e all terms in the left hand side of this equation are positive and hence
the equation is satisfied. The only other relevant value is x = 2 and it can be
verified by hand that this is satisfied for all b. unionsq
If we substitute λ by M2−r, this gives bounds on M for which νMr,c achieves a
certain value. If we denote by Mx the value where νMr,c transitions from x − 1 to
x, we have Mx ≥ 2r−b/x = 2((x−1)r−c)/x. In particular M2 ≥ 2(r−c)/2. It follows
that νMr,c is 1 for M ≤ 2(r−c)/2. Clearly, M must be an integer value, so the value
of νMr,c for M = 1 will be above 1 if r < c + 2.
Case λ = 1. Equation (33) for λ = 1 reads
x (ln(x) − 1) + ln(x − 1) + 1
2
ln(2πx) + 1 ≥ ln(2)b,
and νMr,c is upper bounded by the smallest x such that this inequality holds, or
equivalently, such that
x ≥ ln(2)b − 1 − ln(x − 1) −
1
2 ln(2πx)
ln(x) − 1 .
The right hand side of this equation is upper bounded by ln(2)bln(x)−1 . Therefore, ν
M
r,c
is certainly upper bounded by the smallest x such that
x ≥ ln(2)b
ln(x) − 1 .
This expression can be efficiently evaluated for all values of b, and it turns out
that the value of ν2
r
r,c increases from b/4 for values of b close to 200 to values b/6
for values of b close to 2000.
Case λ > 1. For large λ, Eq. (33) becomes numerically instable. We derive a
formula for integer values of λ, or equivalently values of M that are a multiple
of 2r (w.l.o.g.). By a change of variable from x to x = λ + y we obtain for the
left hand side of (32):
2be−λλx
(x − λ)x! =
2be−λλλ+y
y(λ + y)!
=
2bλy
y(λ + y)y
(λ/e)λ
λ!
≤ 2
bλy
y
√
2πλ(λ + y)y
using Stirling’s approximation. Now (32) holds provided that
2bλy
y
√
2πλ(λ + y)y
=
2b
y
√
2πλ
∏y
i=1(1 +
i
λ )
≤ 1.
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Taking the logarithm:
y
∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
i
λ
)
+ ln(y) +
1
2
ln(2πλ) ≥ ln(2)b. (34)
This equation allows efficiently computing νMr,c for M > 2
r and also to prove a
simple upper bound for the range λ > 1.
Lemma 5. For M a nonzero integer multiple of 2r, we have
νMr,c ≤
M
2r
+ ν2
r
r,c
⌈
√
M
2r
⌉
.
Proof. First of all, note that for λ = 1, (34) is satisfied for y = ν2
r
r,c−1. Therefore,
we have
Ξ :=
ν2
r
r,c−1
∑
i=1
ln(1 + i) + ln(ν2
r
r,c − 1) +
1
2
ln(2π) − ln(2)b ≥ 0.
Our goal is to prove that (34) holds for y = ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
. Since Ξ ≥ 0, we will in
fact prove that
ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
i
λ
)
+ ln(ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
) +
1
2
ln(2πλ) − ln(2)b ≥ Ξ.
Note that
ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
i
λ
)
+ ln(ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
) +
1
2
ln(2πλ) − ln(2)b − Ξ
≥
ν2
r
r,c
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
i
λ
)
−
ν2
r
r,c−1
∑
i=1
ln(1 + i).
This can be rewritten as
ν2
r
r,c−1
∑
i=0
⎛
⎜
⎝
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
j=1
ln
(
1 +
i
⌈√
λ
⌉
+ j
λ
)
− ln(1 + i)
⎞
⎟
⎠ ,
and our claim holds if we can prove that the summand is at least 0 for all
i = 0, . . . , ν2
r
r,c − 1. This is easily verified as
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
j=1
ln
(
1 +
i
⌈√
λ
⌉
+ j
λ
)
≥
⌈√
λ
⌉
∑
j=1
ln
(
1 +
i
⌈√
λ
⌉
λ
)
= ln
⎛
⎜
⎝
(
1 +
i
⌈√
λ
⌉
λ
)⌈√λ
⌉⎞
⎟
⎠ ,
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which is at least
ln
(
1 +
i
⌈√
λ
⌉2
λ
)
≥ ln(1 + i),
as in general (1 + x)y ≥ 1 + xy. unionsq
Clearly, for large M , νMr,c asymptotically converges to M/2
r.
6.6 Dealing with Non-uniform Sampling
In this section we address the non-uniform balls-and-bins problem. We consider
the balls-and-bins problems for some values r and c where the probability that
a ball hits a particular bin (of the 2r bins) is not 2−r. In other words, the
distribution is not uniform. In general the probability distribution for the n-th
ball depends on how the previous n − 1 balls were distributed. We denote this
distribution by D and define D(i | s) as the probability that a ball falls in bin i
given the sequence s of bins in which the previous n− 1 balls fell. We denote by
νD,Mr,c the variant of the function with the same name with the given distribution.
Definition 4. The multicollision limit function for some distribution D, νD,Mr,c ,
with M a natural number, returns a natural number and is defined as follows.
Assume we independently distribute M balls in 2r bins according to a distribution
D. If we call the number of balls in the bin with the highest number of balls μ,
then νD,Mr,c is defined as the smallest natural number x that satisfies:
Pr (μ > x) <
x
2c
.
We can now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6. If for every bin, according to the distribution D the probability for
a ball to end up in that bin satisfies |D(i | s) − 2−r| ≤ y2−r for some y ≤ 0.1
and any i and s, then νD,Mr,c ≤ ν2Mr,c , provided M ≤ y2c and r ≥ 5.
Before proving Lemma6, note that in our application of the lemma in Sect. 6.4,
the ith ball hits a certain bin with probability
2c − (i − 1)
2b − (i − 1) ≤ p ≤
2c
2b − (i − 1) .
Assuming that i − 1 ≤ y2c and y ≤ 0.1, we obtain that (1 − y) · 2−r ≤ p ≤
(1 + y) · 2−r, and that the condition imposed by Lemma6 is satisfied. As in our
setup there are in total M +N queries to f , this is satisfied if M +N ≤ 0.1×2c.
Proof. Consider the following two experiments:
– Experiment 1: we drop 2M balls into 2r bins and the distribution is uniform.
– Experiment 2: we drop M balls into 2r bins and the probability for a ball to
land in any particular bin is between (1 − y) · 2−r and (1 + y) · 2−r.
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We need to prove that ν2Mr,c of the first experiment is at least ν
D,M
r,c of the
second experiment. The general strategy is as follows. First, we prove that
ν2Mr,c is lower bounded by some threshold t. Then, if for all x ≥ t, we have
Pr
(
μexp 1 > x
) ≥ Pr (μexp 2 > x), then νD,Mr,c ≤ ν2Mr,c because x = ν2Mr,c satisfies
the equation Pr
(
μexp 2 > x
)
< x2c . Clearly, the condition above is satisfied if for
all x ≥ t and for all bins i, we have Pr
(
Xexp 1i > x
)
≥ Pr
(
Xexp 2i > x
)
, where
Xi is the number of balls in bin i. And in turn, it is satisfied if for all x ≥ t and
for all bins i, we have Pr
(
Xexp 1i = x
)
≥ Pr
(
Xexp 2i = x
)
.
First, by the pigeonhole principle, in experiment 1 there is always a bin with
max{2M/2r, 1} balls, and ν2Mr,c is at least this value: ν2Mr,c ≥ max{2M/2r, 1}.
Then, consider any bin and the probability that it contains exactly x balls. In
experiment 1, the bin contains exactly x balls if in the sequence of 2M balls, x
balls fall into the particular bin and 2M − x fall in another bin, and thus:
Pr
(
Xexp 1i = x
)
=
(
2M
x
)
· (2−r)x · (1 − 2−r)2M−x.
For experiment 2 we likewise obtain, using the fact that the ith ball ends in the
bin with probability (1 − y) · 2−r ≤ p ≤ (1 + y) · 2−r for any i:
Pr
(
Xexp 1i = x
)
≤
(
M
x
)
· ((1 + y) · 2−r)x · (1 − (1 − y) · 2−r)M−x.
Using that
(
2M
x
)
/
(
M
x
) ≥ 2x and (1−2−r)2 ≥ 1−2·2−r, the condition certainly
holds if
(
2
1 + y
1 − (1 − y) · 2−r
1 − 2−r
)x
≥
(
1 − (1 − y) · 2−r
1 − 2 · 2−r
)M
,
which in turn certainly holds if
(
2
1 + y
)x
≥
(
1 +
1 + y
2r − 2
)M
,
which in turn certainly holds if
(
2
1 + y
)x
≥
(
1 +
1 + y
2r − 2
)max{M,2r−1}
. (35)
We have to prove that this condition holds for all x ≥ max{2M/2r, 1}. The left
hand side is increasing in x, whereas the right hand side is constant in x, and we
therefore only have to prove it for x = max{2M/2r, 1} (w.l.o.g., assuming that
x is integral). Therefore, our goal now is to prove that
2
1 + y
≥
(
1 +
1 + y
2r − 2
)2r−1
.
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Using that 1 + a ≤ ea and r ≥ 5, the condition is satisfied if
2
1 + y
≥ e(1+y) 1630 ,
which in turn holds for y ≤ 0.1. unionsq
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